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I. BACKGROUND
At present, industrial relations in Indonesia is entering a new phase: an era of
transition. The democratization process, partially triggered by the fall of the
authoritarian Soeharto government, together with the implementation of the
regional autonomy policy, is largely influencing this transition.  Previously, industrial
relations in Indonesia was under the tight control of the central government. The
New Order Government regulated the existence of labor unions (at that time only
one labor union was officially recognized by the government), stipulated the level of
minimum wages, and influenced the general labor conditions. Nowadays, the
industrial relations system is becoming increasingly decentralized, even though
many components are still influenced by the paternalistic central government
practices of the past.
Many argue that the reason the industrial relations system in Indonesia is still in
transition is because its future direction remains unclear.  Particularly as to whether
industrial relations will be fully decentralized, partially decentralized where the
dominance of the central government is gradually reduced, or, whether  it is not yet
possible for industrial relations in Indonesia to be free of the legacy of the New Order
centralized policies.
The new government administration and decentralization policy in Indonesia has
transformed the way decisions are made within the industrial relations system.
Nowadays, elements of decentralization as well as dialogue are starting to influence
decision-making processes.  In addition, over the past two years, several changes
have been made to labor laws and regulations.  For example, the local governments
currently have the authority to determine minimum wages in their regions.
Another important development has been the creation of Law No. 21, 2000,
permitting workers to establish unions at the enterprise level. This decision was
made following the ratification of several International Labor Organization (ILO)
conventions, including Convention No. 87, 1948 on “Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize”.
The democratization process and transparent decision-making processes
accompanying these changes have transformed the workers’ attitudes and behavior
when expressing their ideas and objectives. In the past, the voice of the workers was
silenced, and their rights repressed. Now, workers, via labor unions and workers’
movements, are openly making their demands with increasing fervor through strikes
and demonstrations.
On the one hand, the workers’ demands for improved welfare through wage increases
and better working conditions are understandable, bearing in mind the purchasing
power of worker’ wages barely increased before the crisis.  Furthermore, government
policy and legislation, which has influenced the livelihoods of the workers, has also
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contributed to the increasing number of strikes and demonstrations in Indonesia,
particularly since mid 2001.1
On the other hand, the slow recovery from the economic crisis, in combination with
symptoms of the global recession which have impacted negatively on the international
market, have recently created a dilemma for employers in accommodating the demands of
their employees.2 What’s more, the government’s policy decision to increase nominal
minimum wages by as much as 30-40% in 2002 was a double blow for employers.  From a
macro-economic point of view, a policy which continuously provides for significant
increases in minimum wages has the potential to disrupt labor market flexibility, which
until now has been a part of labor market dynamics in Indonesia.3
There are indications that industrial relations at present are largely colored by a conflict
of interests between employers and employees.  If this discord continues, both employers
and employees risk the chance of financial loss.  Consequently, there is an urgent need to
minimize these disputes.  One way to reach consensus is through intensive dialogue,
where each party is treated as equal and is welcome to express their opinions. Such an
effort to facilitate sound industrial relations requires the involvement of both employers
and employees and their representatives.  There are indications that most employers and
employees actually strongly support this strategy and are making serious efforts to pursue
this path, while recognizing this as a part of a learning process. Unfortunately, these
positive efforts often escape the attention of the media and the wider community.
In order to understand industrial relations in practice in Indonesia during transition
period, the SMERU Research Institute carried out a qualitative study throughout
October and November 2001.  With the support of PEG-USAID for Bappenas,
SMERU visited several regions including Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi
(Jabotabek), Bandung, and Surabaya.  Information was gathered from managers of
the Human Resources Departments and owners of the 47 businesses4 investigated (see
Appendix 1), the committees from 42 labor unions at the enterprise level, workers,
committees of affiliated labor unions at the kabupaten/kota level, the heads or staff of
relevant local government agencies (for example The Office of Manpower), as well as
                                                          
1 This has been identified as a reaction to efforts to withdraw the Minister of Manpower’s Decision No.
Kep-150/Men/2000 on “Settlement of Employment Terminations and Determining the Payment of
Severance Pay, Long Service Pay and Compensation in Firms”.
2 The new administration has made little progress on structural and governance reform, renewing
nervousness in the markets. The events of September 11 in the US and the slowdown in the global
economy worsened the investment climate in Indonesia (Indonesia: The Imperative for Reform, The
World Bank, November 2001).
3 See SMERU Report (2001) on The Impact of Minimum Wages in the Formal Urban Sector which found
a statistically significant negative impact on employment. Manning (1996) and Rama (1996) indicate that
minimum wages are beginning to impact on several types of workers, especially youth, and unskilled female
workers in certain regions. An opposing opinion is presented by Islam and Nazara (2000).
4 Enterprises were  categorized as: (a) either large-scaled businesses (>100 employees) or medium-sized
firms (20-100 employees) based on the criteria provided by Statistics Indonesia; (b) enterprises with
labor unions existing at the enterprise level (approximately 70% of firms investigated); (c) enterprises
that have already been involved in dispute cases with the employees - disputes that involved more
than one employee, were not based on individual reactions, did not always disrupt the production
process, and include collective bargaining processes- (approximately 30% of enterprises investigated);
and; (d) enterprises with either foreign direct or domestic investments.
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business associations such as the Indonesian Employers Association (Asosiasi
Pengusaha Indonesia–Apindo), the Indonesian Textiles Association (Asosiasi
Pertekstilan Indonesia–API) and the Indonesian Footwear Association (Asosiasi
Persepatuan Indonesia–Aprisindo).  Approximately half of the firms in Jabotabek and
Bandung were chosen because they were visited during the previous study conducted
by SMERU on minimum wages, therefore, the team had already established a link
and compiled background information on their minimum wage compliance. Other
factors which influenced the selection of firms for the study include, previous
experience in disputes and the establishment of enterprise unions. Information was
also gathered from secondary data, including laws and regulations, and other sources
such as the mass media. The study focused on the existence of labor unions, the
extent of disputes arising between employers and employees, and the dispute
resolution processes used in these firms.
This paper will particularly focus on industrial relations conditions and practices,
particularly at the enterprise level.
II. BASIC INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
        CONCEPTS IN INDONESIA
It is difficult to define the term “industrial relations” in a precise and universally
accepted way. Industrial relations are more than simply an area of organizational
management, and should be viewed not just in terms of simple organizational work
regulations but in a broader social, political and economic context. Industrial
relations are integrated with, and not separated from the political and economic
environment. The development of industrial relations in Indonesia reflects the
changes in the nature of work within society (in both economic and social  terms)
and differences of view about the employment regulations.  According to Solomon,
industrial relations “encompass a set of phenomena, both inside and outside the
workplace, which is concerned with determining and regulating the employment
relationship. It involves range of concepts, such as fairness and equity, power and
authority, individualism and collectivism, rights and responsibilities, and integrity
and trust”.5
In 1974 the New Order administration formulated its Industrial Relations policy
based on Pancasila, the state ideology, taking into account various Indonesian socio-
cultural factors and traditional values. This Pancasila Industrial Relations
(Hubungan Industrial Pancasila, HIP) policy was outlined in Minister of Manpower
Decision No. 645, 1985 (SK Menaker RI No.645/Men/1985), stipulating relations
between the various agents involved in the production of goods and services, based
on the five principles of Pancasila.6 Pancasila Industrial Relations emphasizes
cooperation and partnership between employees, employers, and the government
                                                          
5 M. Salamon: “Industrial Relations, Theory and Practice, 4th edition”, Prentice Hall, 2000,
pp.4-5, 79-85.
6 Module 1: Education and Training for Trainers in Pancasila Industrial Relations Awareness Raising
Workshops, Institution of Manpower and Workplace Regulations Project, Financial Year 2000,
Ministry of Manpower, 2000.
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with the aim of building an ideal industrial society.7 It is based on the three
principles of partnership between these groups: in the production process; in terms
of responsibility, and gaining the profits/benefits. Pancasila Industrial Relations
endeavors to balance the rights and responsibilities of employees with those of the
employers, as well as each of their obligations towards the other party. Both social
justice and the recognition of reasonable limits determine the balance between
these rights and obligations, rather than the balance of power in the relationship.
Pancasila Industrial Relations endeavors to: establish harmony in the workplace;
increase levels of productivity; and improve the human dignity and values of
employees. If these conditions in the workplace can be achieved, then it is hoped
that harmonious industrial relations will follow, subsequently contributing to
political and social stability which was deemed as paramount to the New Order
regime. However, the principles of Pancasila in Indonesian industrial relations
amounts to no more than an advisory policy as they do not form part of the
industrial relations legislation. In practice, the industrial relations system
envisioned by the Pancasila Industrial Relations policy has not fully eventuated.
III. GOVERNMENT POLICY REFORM IN   
        INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
In Indonesia, the legislation regulating industrial relations did not undergo any
significant changes for more than four decades until 1998 (see Appendix 2 and 3).
Presently, the pertinent regulations in effect are Law No. 22, 1957 on Labor Dispute
Resolution and Law No.12, 1964 on Employment Termination in Private Firms.  In
1997 the government tried to comprehensively improve the labor laws through Law
No.25, 1997 on “Manpower”.  This law was ratified with the objective of modifying
all the laws concerning labor so that they were in line with recent social political and
economic developments. However, the implementation of this law has been
postponed until October 1, 2002 because several unions and NGOs are of the
opinion that it was less conducive to protecting workers than the existing laws,
particularly in regards to the protection of workers’ rights.  In addition, they consider
the process of formulating this law to be morally flawed because it was funded by
social security and insurance (Jamsostek) funds intended for the workers welfare.
There is still the possibility that Law No. 25, 1997 may be revoked entirely, if the
new Bills currently being debated in the Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat -
DPR) are ratified.  These Bills are: Industrial Relations Dispute Resolution Bill,
and the Development and Protection of the Workforce Bill.  The basic difference
between this Industrial Relations Dispute Resolution Bill and the two previous
laws is that dispute resolution is regulated through the Court of Industrial
Relations Disputes as well as through mediation, conciliation and arbitration.
According to SMERU’s findings in the field, workers, unions, enterprise unions, and
employers were not satisfied with the proposed Industrial Relation Dispute
Resolution Bill.8  Only a few of them are of the opinion that a special court for
                                                          
7 Suwarno, S., and J. Elliot, “Changing Approaches to Employment Relations in Indonesia,” in
Employment Relations in the Asia Pacific: Changing Approaches, ed. Bamber, Greg J, pp. 130, 2000
8 Draft 3, proposed between September and October 2001.
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industrial relations disputes will improve the current situation. For example, the
Indonesian Prosperous Labor Union (Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia - SBSI) and the
All-Indonesia Workers Union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia - SPSI) believe that
the resolution of industrial disputes through the present P-4D and P-4P system has
created corruption and collusion and therefore needs to be changed.
Few employers and labor unions understand in detail both the rationale and the
Articles stipulated in the Bill.  The opinions of those who are not satisfied with the
Bill, are both wide and varied, and often based on misunderstanding.  For example,
Apindo argues that apart from being too technical, dispute resolution through the
courts using legal services is expensive and time consuming. While the Bill does not
stipulate the use of legal services, in practice legal services have to be used to build a
case based on legal evidence, which can only be compiled by professional lawyers.
Others believe that industrial relations dispute cases need to be quickly resolved
because they affect the livelihood of many workers.  Furthermore, many doubt the
capacity of the general courts to resolve industrial relations dispute cases, even
though in the future a special court for industrial relations disputes will be formed.
While this skepticism is possibly excessive, according to Suwarto, the Chairman of
the Indonesian Industrial Relations Associations, it is no different from that which
emerged under the tri-partite system which stipulated a role for the Central and
Regional Government Committees.
Both employers and employees are aware that if they seek solutions to industrial
disputes through the courts, employers will be in a stronger position because they
have more funds at their disposal.  Both parties believe that the proposed Bill reduces
workers rights to legal defense from unions, as well as handing over the process of
industrial dispute resolution to the courts.  However, there is no article in the Bill
prohibiting workers from requesting assistance from unions. Compared to the
proposed Bill, generally the unions interviewed in the field are more in favor of Law
No.22, 1957 and Law No.12, 1964, even though the respondents did not mention
specifically which of the articles they believed to be more appropriate.
During the short-term of the Habibie administration (May 1998-October 1999)
important steps were taken in industrial relations. For instance, on 5 June 1998 the
government ratified eight International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on
workers’ basic rights, including ILO Convention No.87, 1948 on “Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize”. This was a positive step
towards creating a fair platform for industrial relation negotiations which would be
internationally more acceptable, particularly in regards to protection for workers to
form or become members of labor organizations which aim to defend and protect
workers’ interests.
The installment of the Abdurrahman Wahid government saw new legislation on
unions ratified through Law No. 21, 2000 on “Labor Unions”.  According to this law,
a labor union can be established with a minimum of 10 members. This law also
stipulates that no party is allowed to prevent the formation of labor unions, nor force
the establishment of unions, or prohibit their formation. Similarly, no party is
permitted to prevent workers from becoming union organizers or members, or
obstruct unions from either carrying out or not carrying out their activities.
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According to the legislation, sanctions will be imposed on any person who does not
comply with the above stipulations.  Through the abolition of the one union policy
(at the national, regional and enterprise level), the new government provided wider
opportunities for unionists to establish free and independent organizations. These
changes, combined with the ratification and subsequent implementation of ILO
Convention No.87, have resulted in a significant increase in union activities.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Manpower Decision No.150, 2000 on “The Settlement of
Employment Termination and Determining the Payment of Severance Pay, Long Service
Pay, and Compensation in Firms” (Kepmenaker No. Kep-150/Men/2000) was issued by the
government in June, 2000.  Prior to the release of Kepmenaker No. Kep-150/Men/2000, the
regulation applicable for settlement of employment terminations was Ministry of
Manpower Regulation No.3, 1996 on “Settlement of Employment Termination and
Determining the Payment of Severance Pay, Long Service Pay, and Compensation in
Private Firms” (Permenaker No.03/Men/1996) which was effective from 14 February 1996.   
In contrast to Permenaker No.03/Men/1996 which resulted in few objections,
Kepmenaker No. Kep-150/Men/2000 drew a strong negative reaction from employers,
who argued that this decision would create a financial burden on employers.  They
disagree with specific articles, including: Article 15 (employers may proceed with
employment termination if employees are absent for more than five consecutive
working days), Article 16 (employer’s obligation to pay 75% of the wages during
termination process), Article 17 (employer’s obligations during the settlement of
employment termination disputes), Article 18 (compensation for retrenched staff
who commit major offences), Article 23 (number of working years which entitles
workers to long service pay), and Article 26 (compensation for workers who
voluntarily resign).  In response to these objections, the government modified several
articles in the Decision through Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration Decision
No. 78, 2001 (Kepmenakertrans No. Kep-78/Men/2001) released on 4 May 2001, and
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration Decision No. 111, 2001 (Kepmenakertrans
No.Kep-111/Men/2001) released on 31 May 2001. These changes eventually triggered
conflict and mass labor unrest because Kepmenakertrans No.78 and No.111 were
believed to favor employers, while Kepmenaker No.150 was considered by unions and
workers to provide adequate protection for employees.
The workers have demanded the reinstatement of Kepmenaker No. Kep-
150/Men/2000 and protested against the release of new decisions using various forms
of industrial unrest and mass strikes in several regions.  For example, in Bandung, the
unrest and total paralysis of the city, resulted in riots where tens of thousands of
workers joined in the three days of protesting.
Considering the negative reaction of the workers to the new decisions, ultimately the
government reinstated Kepmenaker No. Kep-150/Men/2000 on June 15, 2001 despite
employer concern.  The reinstatement of the decision was based on a meeting between
employers, workers’ representatives, and the government, and will remain effective until
the new National Tripartite Forum is formed.  The new forum is a result of the Minister
of Manpower and Transmigration’s awareness that Kepmenakertrans No. Kep-78 and
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111/Men/2001 were not formed based on tri-partite consultation, because previously each
tri-partite meeting always reached a dead-end.9
IV.  INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN PRACTICE
Industrial relations in practice can be examined from 4 major aspects: (i) working
conditions; (ii) the existence of labor unions, both in federations and at the
enterprise level; (iii) the extent of work contracts (KKB/PKB) and collective
bargaining; and (iv) disputes as well as their resolution.
Work Conditions
Although businesses acknowledge that Indonesia’s present economic conditions
are still unfavorable, most businesses ensure that workers’ basic rights (hak-hak
normatif) exist for their workers.  For example, they ensure that minimum wage
requirements are fulfilled (approximately 94% of the sample), additional
allowances and facilities are provided and that leave and working hours are all in
accordance with the regulations.  Yet, because of the government’s frequent
changes to the minimum wage, a number of businesses have been forced to make
several adjustments. Now, some businesses include education levels in their
criteria for determining the level of payment.
Apart from wages paid in cash, a number of businesses also provide other facilities in
kind. These facilities include, medical clinics, company physicians and paramedical
services, lunch coupons, transport to and from work, uniforms and shoes, canteens
with reduced prices, housing, cooperatives, prayer rooms, sport and recreation
facilities, health insurance premiums, as well as Employee Social Security and
Insurance (Jamsostek). The number of facilities provided for the workers generally
depends on the size of the particular business.
The Extent of Labor Unions
As a result of the ratification of the ILO Convention No. 87, 1948 and Law No.21, 2000,
the number of labor organizations in Indonesia has exploded.  By the end of 2001, 61
National Workers Union Federations, one Confederation, more than 144 National
Labor Unions, and approximately 11,000 enterprise unions are registered, with a reported
total membership amounting to 11 million workers10 (see Appendix 4).   The total wage
labor workforce in urban areas is around 18 million.  It is very likely that the reported
number of union membership greatly overstate effective union membership.
According to SMERU’s respondents, there are two types of labor unions which can be
distinguished by the way that they are formed. Firstly, there are labor unions which are
                                                          
9 Bernard Hutagalung, “Pemberlakuan Kempenaker No.150/2000, Kemenangan Para Buruh”, Business
News, 20 June, 2001.
10 Data from the Directorate General of Inspections and Supervision (Binawas), Department of
Manpower and Transmigration, 2001 and Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Briefing at the
Tri-partite National Dialogue with the Association of All-Indonesia Workers Unions in
Kabupaten/Kota Bekasi, 23 November, 2001.
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formed as a base for workers to voice their grievances within a business. These unions
generally have a clear mission, well-defined membership, and sound management.
Secondly, there are labor unions which are established to form a political base, and
include non-workers who claim to act on behalf of enterprise workers. Generally, this
second group has no clear membership, and does not include enterprise workers. It is
not uncommon for these unions to exploit their workers, making them join in
demonstrations on the basis that they are struggling to improve the well being of the
workers, even though the labor unions themselves do not always fully understand the
issues. In other words, in these unions the labor movement is only considered to be a
vehicle for them to achieve their political objectives and obtain money which is
generally believed to come from international NGOs. There are even labor unions
which help fight for workers’ right to severance pay and then request a proportion of
it once it has been received.
According to National Board of Directors from one labor union, the correct process
used to form national labor unions is still being ignored. Until now, national labor
unions have been formed beginning at the national level, rather than from the
efforts of the workers at the enterprise level, without employing any sort of
selection process. This information is supported by data from the Department of
Manpower and Transmigration (see Appendix 4) which indicates that 22
federations of labor unions do not have any data (or records) of their membership
numbers at the enterprise level.11
According to SMERU’s respondents, there are indications to suggest that a
relationship exists between labor unions and certain groups or political parties.  Of
the of Labor Union Federations representatives interviewed, only the Indonesian
Muslim Workers Unions (Sarbumusi) has clearly admitted to being affiliated with the
Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, after being given a mandate to recruit
members of the workforce under their banner. Bambang Wisudo (2001) indicated in
one of his articles that there were three types of labor unions presently operating in
Indonesia.12 These include: labor organizations which tend to compromise with the
government, those labor organizations which lean towards democratic ideologies and
present themselves as militant organizations, and labor organizations which are
managed by (or affiliated with) religious foundations, like the Sarbumusi and
Indonesian Muslim Workers Association (PPMI).
Funding is an important issue for the operation and viability of a labor union.
Funding sources vary, and can include, membership fees, overseas support, their
own business profits, or contributions from other sympathetic businesses. In
particular reference to funding, Muchtar Pakpahan, the chairman of the
Indonesian Prosperous Labor Union (SBSI), has said that he has not had any
problems with funding for the organization that he chairs. He is of the opinion
that if an organization is honest and can be trusted it will receive funding from
                                                          
11 Information obtained from the sample investigated indicated that a number of labor union
federations which have not yet registered with the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration already
have members.
12 Kompas, “Kondisi Hubungan Industrial dan Peraturan Ketenagakerjaan”, 24 June 2001.
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several quarters.13 SBSI, which was established in 1992, received funding from its
members’ fees and donations from several labor unions in America, Australia,
Netherlands and England. In 1992-1993, 100% of SBSI’s funding came from
members’ fees. In 1995-1999, 100% of its funding came from labor unions
overseas.  Meanwhile, after 1999, 60% of SBSI’s funding came from members’ fees
and only 30% from overseas. PPMI, which was established on March 3, 1998,
receives the majority of its funding from members’ fees, the development of their
business organizations as well as contributions from sympathetic conglomerates.
This organization also works together with the ILO and the Japanese Embassy in
carrying out its training.
SMERU’s field research indicates that the effectiveness and professionalism of a labor
union is dependent on how well they are able to organize and recruit their
membership, their level of understanding of their role, function and the regulations
in place, as well as how well they can present their demands, negotiate, and resolve
disputes. Both enterprise unions and workers’ satisfaction levels are a good indication
of the effectiveness of an affiliated labor union. In fact, these issues directly relate to
the maturity of a union’s management or leadership team, both within the enterprise
union itself or within the external affiliated unions, as apart from their political
affiliations (if any exist).
Enterprise Unions
The role of enterprise unions is considered more important than that of the
affiliated labor unions because they have a direct relationship with both the
workers and the businesses, hence they directly impact on the stability of
industrial relations in Indonesia, improve the work environment and enhance
productivity.
The number of enterprise unions formed is still quite small compared to the actual
number of medium and large-scale businesses in operation in the research area.14
This is not only because a large number of businesses still object to the formation of
enterprise unions, but also because workers are not aware of the benefits they will
experience by forming unions.
Generally, the workers have shown more interest in the formation of enterprise unions
after they have experienced industrial unrest which was difficult to resolve within the
enterprise. In each region investigated, only 10-20% of businesses have enterprise
union representation. The following table includes data collected in the field.
Of the 47 businesses investigated, 39 of them already have formed enterprise unions.
Three of them in Bekasi, Tangerang, and Surabaya, have formed two enterprise
unions each with different affiliations. Half of the 42 enterprise unions investigated
including those with enterprise unions which have not affiliated with any other labor
unions, were established after 1997.
                                                          
13 Media Indonesia, “Organisasi Buruh Masih Dicurigai”, 4 May 2001.
14 Based on records from the kabupaten and kota Offices of Manpower.
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Enterprise unions that were formed before 1997 often did not have the support of the
enterprises themselves and as a consequence, several workers were made redundant
and union leaders were both pressured and intimidated by their respective employers.
 Table 1. Total Number of Enterprise Unions within the Research Area
Enterprise Unions
(large and medium)
Kabupaten/Kota Number of Enterprises
(small, medium and large)
Number Percent
Jakarta n.a n.a n.a
Kabupaten Bogor 1,657 170 10.3
Kabupaten Tangerang n.a 250 n.a
Kota Bekasi 1,500 110 7.3
Kabupaten Bekasi 1,300 265 20.4
Bandung n.a n.a n.a
Kota Surabaya 6,000 580 9.7
Total 10,457 1,125* 10.8
Source: Apindo and the local Offices of Manpower in each of the regions investigated.
* :  Kabupaten Tangerang not included.
n.a      :  data not available.
According to a few of the unions investigated within the regions researched, there
are still some businesses which endeavor to obstruct the formation of unions. The
recent flare up of demonstrations and strikes has left businesses, particularly those
with enterprise unions, traumatized and anxious. At the same time, a number of
businesses are concerned that sanctions will be imposed if they violate a regulation,
and therefore, they do not openly obstruct the formation of unions.   
Although there are still businesses that do not endorse the establishment of
enterprise unions, SMERU’s research team did find a small number of businesses that
initiated the formation of enterprise unions themselves. Generally, companies that
support the formation of enterprise unions are aware of the potential benefits for the
business.  For example, one large clothing export company in Bandung, with a
workforce of around 2,600 workers, formed an enterprise union that affiliated with
SPSI in 1997. Until now the union leaders have been appointed by the business
itself, nevertheless, in 2002 the leaders will be chosen directly by the workers. This
business also invited the Bandung Branch Council of the SPSI to provide lessons in
leadership to all unit leaders for three months.
The presence of employer-employee industrial unrest within a large number of
companies where no obvious solution exists tends to be the initial trigger for the
formation of enterprise unions. SMERU’s research team found that enterprise unions
are rarely formed within businesses that have effective dispute resolution mechanisms
in place. For example, eight businesses investigated by SMERU chose not to form
enterprise unions for several reasons, including: the enterprises have fulfilled all of
the workers’ basic and additional rights (hak-hak normatif dan non-normatif); healthy
employer-employee relations already exist, whereby the workers can communicate
their complaints directly to their employers; a forum is provided for communication
between employers and employees when required, for example, through routine
meetings or cooperatives; and businesses consider their workers to be part of their
family or “their partners”. Examples of companies who employ such a system include
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one vehicle spare parts business in Bekasi, with a workforce of 261 employees and a
large food production business in Jakarta with a workforce of 200 employees. Both of
these businesses are based on domestic investment.
Generally, most businesses acknowledge the benefits of enterprise unions once they
have been formed, particularly when it is time to carry out negotiations with workers.
Before the establishment of enterprise unions, businesses would negotiate with all of
the workers or with a representative from each work division. Even though the
businesses are aware that existing enterprise unions are making new demands, the
companies themselves are increasingly experiencing the benefits, including easier
dispute resolution processes at the enterprise level. In addition, enterprise unions can
also monitor discipline within the workplace and act as the social committee to
organize any recreational activities for the company.
The ratification of ILO Convention No.87 and Law No.21, 2000 has also made it
possible to establish more than one enterprise union within an enterprise and at
levels outside of the enterprise. Bearing in mind the existence of many labor unions,
especially at the enterprise level, confusion over the role of particular unions in the
national bargaining process (where only 10 national unions can represent the
workers) has the potential to weaken their bargaining position.  However, this is one
of the consequences which has to be faced during the era of transition, where based
on natural selection, the representative unions are chosen by the workers themselves.
Ultimately, workers can only choose labor unions to represent them in the national
bargaining process which have professional leaders who truly understand labor union
issues, business conditions, and the workers situation. In order to reach these
objectives, extensive time and clear processes are required.
Based on the field research carried out by SMERU, the existence of more than one
enterprise union within a firm was found in several enterprises, and generally did not
result in problems or conflict between the unions concerned.  However, the Indonesian
Employers Association (Apindo), enterprise unions, and workers believe that the
process to form unions based on Law No.21, 2000 is too lenient as  only 10 members
are required to establish an organization. Most of them would prefer that no more than
one enterprise union exist in each firm. They have proposed that unions be formed
based on a percentage of the total number of workers in each enterprise.  Others have
proposed that the requirements for establishing unions be increased from 10 members
to 100 members so that the union can create and implement education programs in an
organized fashion. The SMERU research team found that enterprises, labor unions, and
workers have presented similar rationale regarding their objection to the presence of
more than one enterprise union in each enterprise. This includes: whenever there is
more than one enterprise union existing within a firm, it is more difficult to determine
which union has the right to represent the workers in bargaining or dispute resolution
processes, even though according to a 1985 Ministerial Decree the union with at least
50% membership  among all workers should take on this role; it is difficult to
determine which union will represent the workers in national tri-partite negotiations.
Unions across the board may only be represented by 10 unions in these forums, similar
to the 10 employers’ representative organizations and government representatives that
can take part in the negotiations; and the existence of more than one union within an
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enterprise is considered to be the source of conflict in the workplace because it has a
dominating influence over members and workers.
Although a labor union can be formed with a minimum of ten employees, medium-
scale businesses are generally of the opinion that their workers do not require a
union. The employers believe that their employees do not require an enterprise union
because until now they have been able to resolve any employer-employee disputes
themselves. They believe that the workers can approach their superior or
management individually if they experience problems.   
In general, the employees interviewed during this research consider the enterprise
unions that have been operating within their businesses up until now effective.
They are of the opinion that they listen to their complaints and provide a forum for
employees to express their grievances as well as defend the workers interests and
rights. In addition, they resolve disputes, which can include protecting the workers,
and acting as a bridge or mediator between the workers and their enterprises.
Collective Labor Agreements
Meanwhile, workplace agreements (now more commonly known as workplace
contracts, and both are called collective labor agreements) are regulated by
Ministerial Decision No.Per-01/Men/85 on “Mechanisms Used to Formulate
Workplace Agreements”.  Article 1 of this Decision defines a workplace agreement as
a labor contract, which is the same as was regulated in Law No.21/1954.15 The
Indonesian government prefers businesses with a workforce of more than 100
employees to issue a collective labor agreement.16  Businesses with a workforce of
more than 25 employees, which do not have a collective labor agreement in place,
are required to formulate internal enterprise regulations. A shift from the
implementation of internal enterprise regulations to the implementation of collective
labor agreements is regulated in letter No.B.444.BW/1995, Director General of
Inspection and Supervision (Binawas), on upgrading internal enterprise regulations to
become collective labor agreements.
According to data from the Ministry of Manpower, in 1997 there were 163,846
businesses operating in Indonesia. Of these, 30,017 were medium-scale businesses,
another 13,552 were large-scale businesses and 10,962 or 6.6% had collective labor
agreements in place.17  In the same year, there were some 14,023 enterprise unions
registered with the Ministry of Manpower, which indicated that 78% already had
collective labor agreements in place. According to the general chairperson of the All-
Indonesia Workers’ Union (SPSI),18 there was some 23,525 collective labor
                                                          
15 Article 1 of Law No.21,1954, states that a labor contract is a contract drawn up between labor
unions, employers and a legal body. This contract is used by labor unions after they have registered
with the Ministry of Labor. They generally cover workplace requirements which need to be taken into
account in workplace contracts.
16Bisnis Indonesia,  S. Sianturi (former Director General of Inspections and Supervision),  Ministry of
Manpower, “Baru 10.962 perusahaan yang punya KKB”, October 2, 1997.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
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agreements in place within Indonesian businesses in 1997, but only 12,747 internal
enterprise unions have registered with the All-Indonesia Workers’ Union Federation
(FSPSI), therefore at least 10,776 of all the collective labor agreements in place are
“unofficial”. 19
Up until January 2001, some 2,175 enterprise unions have been registered and 1,429
collective labor agreements have been agreed upon in East Java alone. As a means of
comparison, as many as 4,504 internal enterprise regulations have been formulated
during the same time period.
The composition of internal enterprise regulations and collective labor agreements
within the sample enterprises is indicated in the following Table 2 (see also
Appendix 5). In this table, it is evident that 30% of enterprises have internal
enterprise regulations, 58% have collective labor agreements, and 12% have
neither internal regulations nor collective labor agreements (consists of three large
enterprises and three medium enterprises).
Table 2. Internal Enterprise Regulations, Collective  Labor Agreements
Already in effect in the Firms Surveyed
Internal Enterprise
Regulations
(PP)
Collective Labor
Agreement
 (KKB/PKB)
None*
Number of workers Number of workers Number of workers
Firms
> 25 < 25 > 100 < 100 > 100 < 100
With enterprise
Unions
9 0 26
**
1 3 0
Without enterprise
Unions
5 0 0 0 0 3
Total 14 0 26 1 3 3
Percent 30 58 12
Key:   * No internal enterprise regulations or collective labor agreements in place
        ** One firm still has a draft version
On average, the articles outlined in the collective labor agreements were overall
quite uniform throughout the regions researched. They include: general
stipulations, acknowledgement of enterprise unions and the facilities provided for
the unions, work relations, work hours, wages, workplace health and safety,
permission for leave and holidays, disciplinary regulations, sanctions imposed as a
result of regulation violations, retrenchment, and complaint resolution processes.
Information collected in the field indicates that both employers, and employees
who are represented by their enterprise union, are generally involved in the
formulation of collective labor agreements. In fact, one large textile company in
Bandung involves 90% of its employees in the process. Nevertheless, there are
still a small number of cases where collective labor agreements have been
singularly created by the businesses, and union representatives have been forced
to read and agree to them. When collective labor agreements are being
negotiated, the Director of the enterprise, the Human Resources Manager and the
Production Manager generally represented the businesses.  Several businesses have
                                                          
19 Collective labor agreements are only formulated when an enterprise union exists.
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also used a legal consultant who is not a business employee. Meanwhile, the
workers tend to be represented by their enterprise union leaders and on occasion,
the coordinating body of the labor union is included in the negotiating process.
Draft collective labor agreements, which have already been agreed upon by both
parties, are submitted to the local Office of Manpower and Transmigration to ensure
that none of the articles included are in contradiction to the official manpower
regulations. Collective labor agreements operating in the businesses investigated, on
average, are valid for two years and can be extended for an additional year.
Although collective labor agreements are formulated based on an agreement
reached between employers and employees, disputes still arise.  Often cases of
industrial unrest arise as a result of issues unrelated to the regulations agreed to.
For example, employees recently demanded that wages and transport allowances
be increased because of a rise in fuel prices. Consequently, collective labor
agreements are generally deemed insufficient as a means to ward off industrial
disputes.
Disputes and their Resolution
From the cases of industrial disputes and strikes found in the 47 enterprises visited, the
main origins of disputes in most enterprise can be grouped into four categories:
(i) Non-normative demands.  This refers to issues not regulated in legislation or
collective labor agreements.  These disputes are often a reflection of worker’s
discontent over working conditions such as the absence of, or insufficient
allowance provided for food, milk, transport, and recreational activities.  Also,
these demands may concern matters such as wage systems, menstrual leave for
female workers, clarity of worker status, distribution of benefits, inadequate
workplace facilities, and so on.
(ii) Normative demands. These are demands for workers rights as stipulated in
various laws and legislation, which are mutually agreed to in collective labor
agreements. These include employer compliance to recent adjustments in
government policy concerning manpower; compliance to minimum wage
requirements or wages as agreed to in a tripartite dialogue; and other
benefits such as overtime pay, maternity leave, marital and maternal
allowances, bonuses, the organization of labor unions and democratic
appointment of representatives, retirement allowances, bonuses, and
severance pay.
(iii) Interference and involvement of third parties, such as workers from other
enterprises and other affiliated labor unions, often provoke workers to fight
for their interests. This also includes acts of solidarity in expressing their
demands en masse, concerning issues such as the implementation of
minimum wage requirements, larger food and transport allowances due to
the increased price of gasoline, and menstruation leave for female workers.
(iv) Pressure from a number of workers inside the enterprise, forcing other workers
to support their cause through demonstrations or strikes.
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Other origins of conflict include: solidarity for fellow workers believed to have
been treated unfairly by the employer; diverging perceptions on government
laws and regulations; demanding the resignation of the Human Resources
Department Manager who is viewed as too strict and biased towards the
enterprise; changes in corporate management which are viewed as inconsiderate
to worker’s interests and welfare; demands for transparency in enterprise
management; new government policies which affect worker’s welfare (such as
increases in gasoline prices, in effect increasing transport costs and the overall
price of staple goods); the implementation of Kepmenakertrans No. Kep-
78/Men/2001 to replace Kepmenaker No. Kep-150/Men/2000; perceived non-
transparency on the company’s behalf concerning profits; suspicions of
embezzlement concerning Jamsostek premiums; impatience of workers in waiting
for results of negotiations; or other new demands which are surfacing along with
worker’s increased knowledge of their rights following the formation of an
enterprise union in their workplace.
Appendix 6 and 7 show the industrial disputes in the sample firms.  Appendix 7
indicates that the frequency and seriousness of disputes in Surabaya is far greater
compared to the other areas. There is no clear reason for such discrepancies
throughout the area. However, there are a number of possible factors that may
influence the situation, for example, different methods may be used by labor unions
to handle disputes in Surabaya compared to other areas, or it could even be related
to the fact that Surabaya is an intensive labor industrial area. Nevertheless, more
detailed study is required to reveal the primary causes of this unrest.
Below we cite various examples of industrial disputes, both those accompanied
and not accompanied by strikes, with different origins of conflict such as: non-
normative demands, disagreement over bonuses, strikes engineered by a small
group of workers, conflict over normative demands, and strikes provoked by
external parties. In some of the cases, the disputes became violent.
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Box 1
A Dispute Concerning Non-normative Rights
During the last five years, the main cause of industrial disputes in a large garment
manufacturer (based on domestic capital) in Bogor, employing around 7,800 workers, has
been demands for non-normative workers’ rights. These include non-normative demands to:
• Increase the transport allowance by 5%, and increase the food allowance by as much as
Rp500 per worker per day as a result of increased fuel prices.
• Accommodate the need for a prayer room (musholla)
• Provide a lunch room and adequate toilet facilities
• Hold recreational activities once a year
• Increase the coverage for medical expenses
The above demands have usually been responded to positively by corporate management and
are resolved through bipartisan agreements.
Box 2
An Industrial Dispute Caused by Delayed Compliance with the Minimum Wage Policy
The main cause of an industrial dispute in a large garment company in Bekasi in May
2001 was  over the employer’s lack of compliance with the changes to the minimum wage.
Workers demanded that the regulation stipulating an increase in minimum wages be
implemented immediately. The dispute in this enterprise employing 1,200 workers was
able to be resolved after fiery debate between worker representatives (24 individuals), the
enterprise union, and firm’s representatives.
The result of the tripartite dialogue was that the company had to observe the increase in the
2001 minimum wage of Rp426,000, effective from the beginning of July 2001. The increased
wages for the three previous months (March-May) were to be added collectively to the
workers’ pay in July. Consumers of the company’s products also pressured the company to raise
the wages for workers who have been with the company for more than one year, by as much as
Rp3,000 above the minimum wage.
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Box 3
A Strike Due to Disagreement Over Bonuses
In July 2001, workers from one of the largest textile companies in Bandung with a
workforce of 1013 workers held a strike to demand a bonus. While representatives of the
All-Indonesia Workers Union (SPSI) were making their demands to the management,
400 workers held up banners at the front gate of the business exclaiming “We Want
Bonus”. Company management attempted to calm the workers and requested that they
keep working while waiting for the results of the negotiations. The workers ignored their
request, even after company representatives informed them that they would not negotiate
if the workers continued their strike.
During the negotiation process, SPSI asked the shift coordinators and their department to act
as representatives for the workers, but they were unwilling to do so. Each workers’
representative proposed a sum for the amount of the bonus that they desired. One
representative suggested a bonus ten times their present wage.
Until noon, no agreement had been made over the amount of the bonus. SPSI proposed a
bonus which would be 2.5 times their usual wage, but the company suggested a bonus of
Rp400,000 for each worker. At first SPSI held to their initial proposal, but the company
suppressed their demands and only offered a bonus equal to one months pay. SPSI finally
agreed to the amount.
Later in the day, the number of workers on strike had increased because workers who were
rostered-on for the night shift had started to arrive. They refused the one-month wage bonus
offered by the company and stated that they would only approve it if the bonus was equally
distributed amongst the employees. Both company and SPSI representatives did not agree
with this demand. Without any agreement being reached, the company dismissed the workers
for four days while they formulated points of agreement as proposed by the Office of
Manpower. SPSI was then invited to witness (with their signature) the six points of
agreement in front of the company’s management team, board of directors, division heads, and
two representatives from the Office of Manpower.
Four days later, the company requested that workers sign one of two agreement options:
namely, to either accept or decline the one-month pay bonus. Those who declined would
not be allowed back to work, while those who agreed would receive their one-month pay
bonus at the end of the month. Aside from that, the company also demanded that the
workers who engineered the strikes be interrogated. For that purpose a Special Committee
was formed, consisting of company representatives and the police. Initially it was also going
to include a SPSI representative, but they declined because they were unwilling to
interrogate their own members. The Special Committee questioned 22 employees. One of
the workers questioned resigned from the company without any clear reason. Two days
later, SPSI received a letter from the police regarding the results of the investigation and
asked that SPSI authorize five commitments on the part of workers, including: that the
workers being questioned in the case do not wear their uniform, and that the workers have a
right to be accompanied by their lawyer while questioned by the police. As a result, two
workers were suspended, two were given their third letter of reprimand, and another 17
received their first letter of reprimand. The two workers who were suspended did not accept
the outcome of the investigation and have proceeded to report their case to Regional
Government Committee. SPSI is currently preparing the defense argument for its members.
The enterprise's deliberate involvement of the police in this dispute is a clear indication that
this enterprise has not learned from their experience with previous strikes and is yet to
understand dispute settlement measures as regulated in the legislation.
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Box 4
A Strike with No Prior Notice or Clear Demands
In 2000, members of the enterprise union in a cable manufacturing firm in Surabaya (based
on foreign investment) padlocked the front gate of the factory. In effect, as many as 800
workers could not enter their workplace. The organizers of the enterprise union forced their
fellow workers to strike without giving prior notice to the firm’s representatives.
That very same day the firm’s representatives attempted to carry out a dialogue with the
enterprise union representatives, but it turns out that they were yet to make any demands. On the
second day, representatives of the enterprise union submitted their demands, including increases
to their food and transport allowance. On the third day, worried about the prospect of loosing
their jobs, workers pushed the enterprise union representatives to allow them to work. The
workers were finally able to commence working on the fourth day.
This industrial dispute was settled through tri-partite dialogue.  As a result, the firm agreed to
the demands of the enterprise union representatives: increasing the workers’ food allowance
from Rp36,000 to Rp66,000 per month, and transport allowance from Rp39,000 to Rp69,000
per month. Even though the demands were agreed to, as a result of the industrial unrest,
eight union organizers resigned, while three other organizers had to formally apologize to the
corporation. At the time the research was conducted, the three people mentioned were still
working in the firm.
Table 3. Industrial Disputes Categorized by the Source of Capital
Industrial Disputes
FDI/DI* Scale Minor Average Major Massive No
disputes
Total
FDI Large
Medium
2
1
5
0
3
0
0
0
3
0
13
1
DI Large
Medium
8
1
8
1
7
0
3
0
3
2
29
4
Total 12 14 10 3 8 47
Percent 26 30 21 6 17 100
* FDI: Foreign Direct Investment (PMA).
DI: Domestic Investment (PDN).
Based on four categories of disputes20, the SMERU team noted that within the last
five years, only three out of the 47 respondent enterprises (6%) have experienced
massive disputes, 10 (21%) encountered major disputes, 14 (30%) experienced
average disputes, 12 (26%) experienced minor disputes, while eight of the enterprise
investigated have not encountered any disputes apart from minor grievances and
handling cases of individual differences, as claimed by both employees and employers
(see Appendix 6).
                                                          
20 Four categories of industrial relations disputes are as follows: (a) Minor disputes: disputes without
strikes, bipartite resolution; (b) average disputes: disputes with strikes, bipartite resolution; (c) major
disputes: disputes without strikes, tripartite resolution; and (d) massive disputes: disputes with strike,
tripartite resolution.
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Both affiliated labor unions and employers associations advise their members to
settle industrial disputes through bipartisan agreement. Tripartite negotiations and
options to bring the case to a higher level are considered costly and time consuming
without always delivering the desired outcome. In practice, most industrial disputes
in the enterprises researched (both those including and not including labor strikes),
were resolved through bipartite dialogue. Only a few cases were settled through
tripartite dialogue, including being passed on to the Regional and National
Government Committees.
The following examples illustrate industrial disputes accompanied by labor strikes
that were resolved through bipartite agreement, and other disputes, which had to be
settled through tripartite mechanisms, Regional and National Government
Committees, and through the court.
Box 5
An Industrial Dispute Accompanied by A Strike and Resolved Through Bipartite Dialogue
Workers from a large wood-molding manufacturer in Surabaya frequently chose strikes as a
way of expressing their demands. In seven years the workers held four strikes. The first was
carried out in 1994 (requesting an attendance bonus), the second strike in 1996 and
demanded uniforms for the workers, but apparently the request was denied and as a result the
workers again held strikes in 1998 and 2000 with the same demand. Organizers of the
enterprise union affiliated to the All Indonesia Workers Union (SPTP-SPSI) commented
that most of the workers’ demands covered non-normative rights because the enterprise has
already fulfilled the normative rights of the workers. Even with frequent disputes and strikes,
workers and members of SPTP SPSI would rather chose bipartite negotiations. Previous
experience with dispute settlement through the Office of the Manpower proved time
consuming, similar to efforts to resolve disputes through the Regional Government
Committee, where even after four months of waiting there was no resolution.
Box 6
Bipartite Dispute Settlement Following Massive Employment Termination
In 1996 a dispute arose which was triggered by massive redundancies, due to both measures to
automate production and the economic crisis. Replacing manual machines with new
automatic machines resulted in 120 workers being made redundant. A second dispute in
1997 was triggered by the dismissal of 60 workers, a number of them entering their
retirement. This time the dismissal was not only a side effect of automation, but it was also
influenced by the economic crisis.
The enterprise released a new workforce policy; that workers involved in labor strikes would
not receive their wage for the duration of the strike. The policy was formulated to make it
clear to other enterprises that workers who participated in strikes would not be paid.
Therefore, both sides suffered losses due to the strike; the company was burdened by losses in
production, and the workers lost their daily wage for the duration of the strike.
Efforts to resolve the dispute did not encounter any major obstacles because the company had
acted in accordance with regulation Kepmenaker No.3, 1996. A speedy agreement was also
reached because those workers who were terminated from their positions were offered
severance pay as stipulated in the regulations, and the company’s streamlining efforts were
mainly directed towards workers approaching retirement.
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Box 7
An Industrial Dispute Settled Through Tri-partite Dialogue
A strike at a large textiles company (based on domestic investment) in Tangerang in 2000
included 4,800 workers demanding wage adjustments due to the recent rise in gasoline
prices. At the same time the enterprise union was involved in dialogue with the firm’s
executives, a small group of workers mobilized other workers to hold a strike. According to
statements made by the enterprise union representatives, the peaceful strike that continued
over six days was not under the control of the union. As a result of the strike, five
technicians (of other nationalities) were dismissed from their positions, along with four
other employees. This case was submitted to the Regional and Central Government
Committees in an effort to reach a tri-partite resolution, but up until this research was
conducted, no agreement had been reached.
Box 8
An Industrial Dispute Settled at the National Level
Workers at a large enterprise (based on domestic capital) held a massive strike for three days
in June 2001. They insisted that the enterprise immediately comply with Kepmenaker No.
Kep-150/Men/2000. No less than 20,000 workers from every division of the enterprise
participated in the strike.
News of the dispute was acquired from the enterprise union organizer in one of the divisions
of the enterprise which manufactured PVC pipes and employed 2,000 workers. The
settlement of the dispute was conducted through the Central Government Committee rather
than internally. Considered as a mass dispute, representatives of the enterprise union from
every division in the enterprise decided to meet with the Minister of Manpower and the
Indonesian President. During the meeting the President did not provide a solution to the
dispute, forcing the workers to again seek dialogue with the company. Finally the employers
agreed to immediately comply with Kepmenaker No. Kep-150/Men/2000.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1. The system of industrial relations in Indonesia is undergoing a transition
from a heavily centralized and government-controlled system, to a more
decentralized system where employers and employees negotiate the terms
and conditions of employment at the enterprise level. However, many
components are still influenced by the paternalistic central government
practices of the past. This transition is in line with the changes in the
broader social and political context, where Indonesian society has recently
transformed itself from a society under the control of an authoritarian
regime to one which is more democratic.
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2. Outside of issues concerning wages under the industrial relations policy, the
SMERU research team’s findings indicate that other aspects of industrial
relations at the enterprise level are generally functioning properly. Most
employers stated that despite the burden, they had complied with the new
regulations because they were formulated through a tri-partite negotiation. In
addition, the enterprises did not want to initiate disputes with their employees.
3. Most disputes can be resolved through bipartite dialogue. Both employees (or
enterprise unions) and employers argue that there are few serious indications of
tension in employee-employer relations. Both parties are still undergoing a
learning process: employees are learning to exercise the freedom to organize,
articulate their demands, and find better methods of negotiation, whereas
employers are learning to regard employees as work partners.  
4. The government’s contribution to facilitating the smooth running of the new
system has been considered inadequate and has often undermined the creation of a
more productive industrial relations system. In Indonesia, a stronger union
movement means that the government no longer needs to play a major role in
industrial relations disputes, but rather should act as impartial facilitator and
regulator. However, this may result in less influence and rewards for government
officials.  
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Appendix 1.  Characteristics of the Sample (n=47 firms)
FDI/
DI*
Size of the
Enterprise
Number of
employees
Jakarta Bogor Tangerang Bekasi Bandung Surabaya Berau
E.Kalimantan
Total Percentage
FDI Large 101-1000 0 2 1 2 0 2 0 7 15
> 1000 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 6 13
Medium 20 - 100 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
0 4 1 5 1 3 0 14 30
DI Large 101-1000 6 1 1 2 3 5 1 19 40
> 1000 1 2 2 1 1 3 0 10 22
Medium 20 - 100 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 4 8
7 3 5 3 5 9 1 33 70
Total 7 7 6 8 6 12 1 47 100
Percentage 15 15 13 17 13 25 2 100
Note: * FDI = Foreign Direct Investment (PMA); DI = Domestic Investment (PDN)
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Appendix 2  The Development of Industrial Relations Legislation in Indonesia
Year Manpower Labor/Work
Agreements
Industrial Relations
Disputes and Dispute
Resolution
Wages Freedom of Association
1940s Law No. 12, 1948
On Labor
1950s Law No. 1, 1951
concerning
the Application of Law
No. 12, 1948
in all Indonesian
Provinces
Law No. 21, 1954
on Labor Agreements
Between Labor
Unions and Employers
Law No. 22, 1957
on
Labor Dispute Resolution
Law No. 80, 1957
on Wages
Law No. 18, 1956 on the
Ratification of ILO Convention No.
98 of 1949 concerning the Right to
Organize and Collective Bargaining
1960s Law No. 14, 1969
on the General Provisions
concerning Labor
Law No. 12, 1964
On
Employment Termination in
Private Firms
Law No. 25, 1997
on Manpower
(postponed)
Presidential Decree No. 83, 1998 on
the Ratification of ILO Convention
No. 87 of 1948 concerning the
Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize
1990s
Law No. 11, 1998 on
Amendments to the
Application of
Law No. 25/1997
concerning Manpower
Post
2000
The Development and
Protection of the
Workforce Bill  
The Industrial Relations
Dispute Resolution Bill
Law No. 21, 2000 on Labor Unions
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Appendix  3. The Development of Industrial Relations Regulations in Indonesia
Year Manpower Labor/Work Agreements Industrial Relations Disputes and
Dispute Resolution
Wages Freedom of Association
1950s Government Regulation
No.49,1954 on “Methods to
formulate and regulate labor
contracts”
1970s Ministerial Regulation Per
02/Men/1978 on “Internal
enterprise regulations and
the formulation of labor
contracts”
1980s Ministerial Decision
No. 645/Men/1985
on “Pancasila
Industrial Relations “
Ministerial Regulation No.
01/Men/1985 on
“Mechanisms used to
formulate workplace
agreements”
Government Regulation
No. 8, 1981 concerning
Wage Protection
Ministerial Decision No. Kep-15A/
Men/1994 on “Guidelines to
Industrial Relations Dispute
Resolution and Employment
Termination at the Enterprise Level
and Mediation”
Circular No.08, 1990
Concerning
Wage and non-Wage
Components
Ministry of Manpower Decision
Kep-272/Men/1999 on
“Revocation of Ministerial
Regulation  04/Men/1996
concerning Retribution for
Unions”
1990s
Ministry of Manpower Regulation
No.3, 1996 on “Settlement of
employment termination and
determining the payment of
severance pay, long service pay and
compensation in private firms”
Ministerial Regulation
No. 02, 1999 on
Minimum Wages
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Year Manpower Labor/Work Agreements Industrial Relations Disputes and
Dispute Resolution
Wages Freedom of Association
2000 Ministry of Manpower Decision
No.150/Men/ 2000 on
 “The settlement of employment
termination and determining the
payment of severance pay, bonuses,
and compensation in firms”
Governor/Bupati/Mayor
Decrees
on
Minimum Wages
Ministry of Manpower and
Transmigration Decision No.78,
2001 on “ Amendments to Several
Articles in Kepmenaker No Kep-
15/Men/ 2000”
Ministry of Manpower and
Transmigration No. Kep-
16/Men/2001 on “The
Registration of Labor
Unions”
2001
Ministry of Manpower and
Transmigration Decision No.111,
2001 on “Amendments to Article
35A Kepmenakertrans
No. Kep-78/Men/2001”
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Appendix 4.  List of Labor Union Federations
NUMBER OF ENTERPRISE UNIONS
No
NAME OF LABOR ORGANIZATION
(in BAHASA)
COMMITTEE
(HEAD)
REGISTRATION
NUMBER Based on
Department of
Manpower Data
Based on Field
Information*
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (FSPSI) Jacob Nuwa Wea B. 936/M/BW/98 6.241
2 Dewan Executif F-SPSI Reformasi Andi Hisbulin P B.892/M/BW/98 3.149
3 Federasi Serikat Buruh Demokrasi Indonesia (FSBDSI) A. Azis Riambo , SH B.959/M/BW/98 121
4 Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI) DR. Muchtar Pakpahan B.1025/M/BW/98 229
5 Serikat Buruh Muslim Indonesia (SARBUMUSI) Drs.H. sutanto M B. 451/M/BW/98 11 Surabaya: 30
6 Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (PPMI) Eggi Sujana B. 334/M/BW/99 122
7 Gabungan Serikat Pekerja Medeka Indonesia (GASPERMINDO) Moh. Jumhur Hidayat Kep. 250/M/BW/2000 10
8 Federasi Organisasi Pekerja Keuangan dan Perbankan Indonesia  (FOKUBA) Kodjari Darmo B. 379/M/BW/99 32
9 Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis (KBM) M. Pasaribu -
10 Kesatuan Pekerja Nasional Indonesia (KPNI) Dr. Haryono. MBA Kep.345/M/BW/98 9
11 Kesatuan Buruh Kebangsaan Indonesia (KBKI) DR. M. Ali, SH, MSC B. 102/M/BW/99 - Surabaya: 3
12 Asosiasi Karyawan Pendidikan Swasta Indonesia (ASOKADIKTA) Drs. H. Dedi Hamid, SH B. 1119/M/BW/98 -
13 Gabungan Serikat Buruh Industri Indonesia (GASBIINDO) H. Agus Sudono B. 082/M/BW/99 194
14 Asosiasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (ASPEK INDONESIA) Indra Tjahya KEP. 421/M/BW/2000 65
15 Serikat Pekerja Keadilan (SPK) Ir. Eddy Zamut, MSAE 1
16 Serikat Pekerja Metal Indonesia (SPMI) Thamrin Mosi B. 178/M/BW/98 115
17 Gabungan Serikat Buruh Independent (GSBI) Sobirin 1
18 Dewan Pengurus Pusat Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (KOPRI) Drs. HM Faisal Tamim B. 343/M/BW/99 -
19 Federasi Serikat Pekerja BUMN Drs.H.Bambang Syukur B. 559/M/BW/99 28
20 Serikat Buruh Merdeka Setiakawan Saut H.Aritonang B. 658/M/BW/99 -
21 Serikat Pekerja Nasional Indonesia HM Amri, MBA B. 493/M/BW/99 12
22 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Tekstil, Sandang dan Kulit (FSP.TSK) Rustam Aksan 40/M/BW/2000 680
23 Gabungan Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (GOBSI) Y. Yahya KEP. 395/M/BW/2000 57 Bandung: 68
24 Asosiasi Karyawan Pendidikan Nasional (ASOKADIKNA) Soeganda Priatna KEP. 451/M/BW/2000 -
25 Federasi SP Penegak Keadilan Kesejahteraan & Persatuan (SPKP) Andry WM 178/FSP-SPKP/DFT/BW /2000 49
26 Federasi SP Rakyat Indonesia (SPRI) Ruslan Effendy. SE 186/FSP-SPRI/DFT/BW /2000 28
27 Federasi Kimia Energi Pertambangan (KEP) Syaiful 187/FSP-KEP/DFT/BW/ IX/2000 481
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28 Federasi SP Indonesia (SPI) Siraj EL Munir Bustami 190/FSP-SPI/DFT/BW/IX/2000 23
29 Front Nasional Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia (FNPBI) Dita Indah Sari 191/FSP-GSBM/DFT/BW/X/2000 14
30 Federasi Gabungan Serikat Pekerja Mandiri (GSBM) Amran Simanjuntak Kep.199/FSP-
GSBM/DFT/BW/X/2000
22
31 Federasi Perserikatan Buruh Indonesia (FBI) Yudhi S Hidayat Kep 502/FSP-SBP/
DFT/BW/XI/2000
5
32 Federasi Serikat Buruh Perjuangan  (FSBP) Drs. HM. Syahrin, BSc Kep. 745/M/BW/2000 -
33 Federasi Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (FAJI) Didik Supriyanto Kep. 742/M/BW/2000 58
34 Federasi Gabungan Serikat Pekerja PT. Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia
(GSPRNI)
Ir. Widodo Rahardjo 216/FSP-
FARKES/RIF/DFT/BW/XII/00
-
35 Federasi Farkes Reformasi Djufnie Ashary 223/FSPM/DFT/BW/ 2001 68
36 Federasi SPM (Hotel, Restoran, Plaza, Apartemen, Katering, dan Pariwisata
Indonesia)
Isep Saepul Mubarah 231/FSP – GASPERMINDO/
DFT/BW/II/2000
9
37 Gaspermindo Baru Miyadi Suryadi, SH 13/DPP-GSBI 2000/III – 2001 20
38 Gabungan Serikat Buruh Indonesia 2000 (DPP GSBI 2000) 140/I/DPP/FSPK/03-2001 -
39 Federasi SP Kahutindo Dra. Hj.Sofiati Mukadi 400
40 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Pariwisata (SP PAR) Djoko Daulat 725
41 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Percetakan, Penerbitan dan Media Informasi Isprapto 87/V/VII/2001 -
42 Federasi SP Pertanian dan Perkebunan Hartono 78/V/VII/2001 905
43 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Bangunan dan Pekerjaan Umum (SP BPU) Drs. Syukur Sarto,MS 118/V/N/2001 -
44 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Bank, Niaga Jasa dan Asuransi (NIBA) T. Zoelficakib 104/V/N/VII/2001 - Surabaya: 24
45 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Farmasi dan Kesehatan Alexander Sinaga 98/V/N/III/2001 107
46 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Angkutan Darat, Danau, Feri Sungai dan
Telekomunikasi Indonesia (SP ADFES)
Drs.H Sofjan Soedjaja,
MA
-
47 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Logam, Elektronik dan Mesin (FSP LEM) Hikayat A.K 77/V/N/III/2001 720
48 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Rokok, Tembakau, Makanan dan Minuman (FSP
RTMM)
Tosari Wijaya 109/V/N/VII/2001 - Surabaya: 39
49 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Kependidikan Seluruh Indonesia (F SPKSI) Drs. Firman Hadi, Bclp 96/V/N/VII/2001 -
50 Federasi Serikat Pekerja TSK SPSI A. Sidabutar 89/V/VII/2001 753
51 Federasi SP Perkayuan dan Kehutanan (FSP KAHUT- SPSI) M. Silalahi - Surabaya: 33
52 Federasi SP Transportasi Indonesia (FSP TI) Drs. M.CH.David - Surabaya: 25
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53 Federasi SP Kimia, Energi dan Pertambangan  ( FSP KEP) Jacob Nuwa Wea 217
54 Federasi SP Maritim Indonesia (FSP MI) Oesodo H.D.S -
55 Kesatuan  Pelaut Indonesia ( KPI ) Hanafi Rustandi -
56 Federasi SP Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri  ( FSP TKI LN) Drs. Azwar Nadlar -
57 Federasi  Serikat Buruh Karya Utama (FSBKU) Dwi Agustin 560/04-DKK/PC/kota-TNG/
VIII/2001
5
58 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Perkebunan Nusantara  ( FSP BUN) Drs. HM. S. Ginting 134/I/N/XI/2001 -
59 DPP Gerakan Buruh Markaenis A. Takumansang 190/V/N/I/2001 -
60 Federasi Serikat Pekerja Industri Semen Indonesia (FSP ISI) Muchtar Junaedi 197/V/N/I/2002 12
Source: Sub-directorate of Employer and Employee Empowerment, Department of Manpower and Transmigration, January 2002.
Note: * only noted if the number of labor unions (based on field information) was higher than Department of Manpower and Transmigration data.
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Appendix 5.  Internal Enterprise Regulations (PP) and Collective Labor Agreements in Place
Existence of PP N/A*** TotalFDI/
FI Enterprise unions
Collective Labor
Agreements
FDI* Yes 2 12 0 14
No 0 0 0 0
2 12 0 14
DI** Yes 7 15 3 25
No 5 0 3 8
12 15 6 33
Total 14 27 6 47
Percentage 30 57 13 100
Note: *FDI=
**DI=
Firms based on Foreign Direct Investment (PMA)
Firms based on Domestic Investment (PDN)
***N/A = Not Available, PP, collective labor
agreements  are not in place
Appendix 6. Minimum Wage Compliance, the Existence of Enterprise Unions, and Industrial Disputes
Minimum wage compliance Industrial Disputes*FDI/
DI
Size of the
Firm Yes No
Existence of
enterprise unions Minor Average Major Massive No disputes Total
FDI Large 13 0 13 2 5 3 0 3 13
Medium 1 0   1 1 0 0 0 0   1
14 0 14 3 5 3 0 3 14
DI Large 27 2 24 8 8 7 3 3 29
Medium 3 1   1 1 1 0 0 2   4
30 3 25 9 9 7 3 5 33
Total 44 3 39 12 14 10 3 8 47
Percentage 94 6 83 26 30 21 6 17 100
Note: *(a) Minor disputes: disputes without strikes, bipartite resolution; (b) average disputes: disputes with strikes, bipartite resolution; (c) major disputes:
disputes without strikes, tripartite resolution; and (d) massive disputes: disputes with strike, tripartite resolution.
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Appendix 7.  Disputes Broken Down by Location
Disputes
Massive Major Average Minor None TotalLocation
Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Surabaya 1 8 6 50 5 42 0 0 0 0 12 25
Jabotabek* 2 7 4 14 7 24 11 38 5 17 29 62
Bandung 0 0 0 0 2 33 1 17 3 50 6 13
Total 3 6 10 21 14 30 12 26 8 17 47 100
Percentage 6 21 30 26 17 100
        Note: * Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi
